Abstract-In this paper, a novel recursive data mining method based on the simple but powerful model of cognition called a conceptor ;s introduced and applied to computer security. The method recursively mines a string of symbols by finding frequent patterns, encoding them with unique symbols and rewriting the string using this new coding. We apply this technique to two related but important problems in computer security: (i) masquerade detection to prevent a security attack in which an intruder impersonates a legitimate user to gain access to the resources, and (ii) author identification, in which anonymous or disputed computer session needs to be attributed to one of a set of potential authors. Many methods based on automata theory, Hidden Markov Models, Bayesian models or even matching algorithms from bioinformatics have been proposed to solve the masquerading detection problem but less work has been done on the author identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on two related and important topics in system security: masquerade detection and author identification.
Masquerade detection is often considered the most serious and challenging problem in computer security. Masquerader hides hislher identity by impersonating a legitimate user in a computer system or network and may maliciously damage the system. The typical ways in which masquerade attacks succeed include: obtaining a legitimate user's password, accessing an unattended and unlocked workstation, forging email address in messages, overtaking a computer via a network access. Masquerade detection is challenging for the following reasons: (i) masqueraders entering the system as valid users cannot be detected by the existing access control o� 7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE 424 or authentication, (ii) by perfectly mimicking user's behavior, masqueraders are undetectable, and (iii) the legitimate user may be detected as a masquerader if the user's behavior changes.
To enable masquerade detection, a string from a legitimate user is collected and used to generate a signature containing some attributes (features) of this user. This signature is then compared to the attributes generated from the curr ently monitored string of the potential masqueraders. If normal and intrusion activities are suffiCiently distinct, attributes generated from the legitimate user activities will be more similar to the user's signature than those generated from the masquerader's session. Most previous research follows this logic to distinguish the strings from legitimate users and masqueraders.
A related problem to masquerade detection is identifying the potential internal masqueraders, which can be generalized as an author identification prob/em. This problem is relevant in secured environments, in which only a small number of users with known signatures can originate an attack. Other examples of usefulness of the author identifi cation problem include finding equivalences between emails originated from differently named accounts or detecting plagiarizing among papers or programs. For author identification, a string from each potential author is collected to generate a signature (some attributes or features). Each signature will then be compared to the attributes of the currently monitored string. The author is then decided based on the degree of similarity of the current session and the author signature.
In masquerade detection and author identification, the input is a string of objects (commands, packets, system calls, lines of program execution trace, etc.) produced by a source. The task is to assess whether the monitored string confmns to the ''usual'' behavior of this source, in case of intrusion detection, or which of many possible sources is the most likely producer of the monitored string, in the authorship identifi cation case. The assessment is based on the unique signature of each source collected in the controlled experiment in which the authorship of the signature can be assured.
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In this paper, we propose a novel recursive data mining method originated in our simple yet powerful model of cognition, called a conceptor [5] . In a conceptor, the first level of abstraction of input is based on repeating patterns, but the subsequent ones are based on repeating patterns of lower level abstractions. In recursive data mining method, the input is encoded into symbols and then mined for dominant patterns. Dominant patterns, defined later, are then assigned new codes that are then used to generate the data representation of a higher leveL The input is thus recursively mined until no new dominant pattern exists. During the recursive mining, we generate several features that will be used to form the user's signature profile and will be compared to the features of monitored string. For masquerade detection, one-class SVM is applied to predict the intrusion. For author identification, a weighting prediction scheme is proposed to predict the authorship.
This paper is structured as follows: first, we discuss the recent works in Section II, and then illustrate in detail our recursive data mining method in Section III . We experimented with the encoding policies presented in Table 2 .
B. Training Phase
In training phase, the training data are recursively mined and the dominant patterns are recorded in the training dictionary.
The procedure can be illustrated as follows:
First, we recognize the significant patterns in the input string.
We also count the frequency of each pattern p in the input data, Ap-Then, we calculate the expected number of occurrences of pattern p in the input string Ep: 
Then Np is the total number of strings in which pattern p may appear. Ns is the total number of strings that can be created by using the commands in the input string. N p is thus the N, expected frequency ofpatternp.
If Ap > m X max (Ep, 1), then pattern p is a significant pattern, where m is a constant whose choice impacts the number of dominant patterns recognized in the input. Third, we rewrite the current string into a new string replacing each window with the code of the dominant pattern followed by the commands in the gaps. The next replacement window starts at the first gap of the previous window in the current string. If the window contains no significant patterns, the next one starts at the symbol next to the start of the current window.
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There are other choices for string rewntmg that lead to different information kept in the higher level and, thus, will influence the training dictionary and the feature values that we will get in the following detection phase.
Finally, we append aU the dominant patterns in the curr ent level into the training dictionary. If there are no new dominant patterns in the current level, the training stops;
otherwise, the rewritten string is used as an input for the next iteration of the data mining.
C. Detection Phase
In this phase, we apply training dictionary to each unit in testing data that are either a 100-command block (for intrusion detection) or the whole string (for author identification) and obtain features for each unit. We will also compute features for training data for the later prediction.
First, we search the training dictionary for each pattern in a unit and record the dominant patterns in this unit. Currently, a perfect match is required between the domain pattern in a dictionary and the substring in a unit. However, a similarity, such as small number of mismatches in corresponding position of the compared strings, or as measured by the Needlman-Wunsch algorithm [13] , can also be used.
Second, we record features for each unit. We experimented with the following features: number of distinct patterns in each unit; number of dominant patterns in each unit; number of distinct dominant patterns in each unit; number of distinct input symbols in each unit; number of users sharing a pattern in each unit; length reduction in each step of the input rewriting in each unit; weighted number of the distinct dominant patterns in each unit (considering the frequency of the dominant patterns in the training dictionary).
Finally, we rewrite the current string, as in training phase.
D. Prediction Phase
For masquerade detection, we apply Support Vector Machine (SVM) [1, 4] [2, 14] to detect intrusion. We can also take the data in the training blocks of the current user as the negative data and the data in the training blocks of other users as the positive data and apply more traditional two-class SVM. However, as discussed by Wang [17] , the positive training data belongs to different users and the positive testing data is from users other than the users in the training data, so such an approach is not appropriate.
Before applying SVM, we need to normalize the data. We apply two normalization methods. Suppose we have a dataset: X = {Xl> Xl,-.. ,�}, then each element will be normalized by the following two methods:
a. ,
where Xavg is the average of Xi, i= 1, 2, . . . , n b. X I X i -xmin ,where Xmin and X1>UIX are the minimum and , X�-X min maximum elements in the set, respectively.
For author identification, we will describe an algorithm to identify the authorship in section IV.
E. Analysis Phase
For masquerade detection, we compare the true value from SEA dataset with the value predicted in Prediction Phase. For any block, false positive rate is dermed as the ratio of the number of false positive blocks to the number of clean blocks in the true value data; hit rate is defined as the ratio of the number of true positive blocks to the number of intruded blocks in the true value data.
For author identification, we will calculate the percentage of the number of authors that are correctly predicted.
IV. WEIGHTING PREDICTION SCHEME
After detecting the masquerade, it is important to know the identity of the masquerader. has the biggest value in its column, we set the value of predictor Pi to 1; otherwise, we set it to O.
Third, we calculate the prediction value by linear combination of the weights and features. Let P (I, J) denote the weighted predictor value for each element R (I, 1). Then weighted predictor value can be calculated by the formula:
Wi is either Wic or wt
Finally, for each column, we find the element with the highest weighted value. The corresponding row index in matrix R is the author of the testing string. That is, for all P(I, J) in column J, we fmd the maximum value of P(I, J) and the corresponding I is the author number.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS

A. Masquerade Detection
In masquerade detection, recursive data mining generates features for each block (including the training block and testing block) that is used by a one-class SVM to classify the blocks and predict the intrusion. We used LIBSVM2.4 [1] for this purpose. For the fIrst variant of our method, called 
Comparison of Normalization Policies
NonnaHzation of input for SVM is important for the SVM perfonnance [4] , so in Figure 3 , we compare the two polices for normalizing the features for intrusion detection. The plots
shows that normalization policy h works slightly better than policy a in most cases. However, the differences are very small. In the similar work, yet applied to the totally different domains, so direct comparison of the results is difficult, Krsul [8] reports 98% accuracy rate by using Multi-layer Perceptron and 100% accuracy rate by using Gaussian Classifier in deciding computer program authorship. Vel [15] achieves 84% accuracy rate in email authorship mining.
Comparison of Encoding Policies
VI. CONCLUSION
Recursive data mining is a new technique for solving computer security problems. In this paper, we show how to apply recursive data mining to solve the masquerade intrusion detection and author identification problems.
Compared to the results from other researchers, our results are very promising. In the future, we will attempt to extend our method to other authorship problems, such as email, papers or programs, or to problems in other domains, such as DNA identification and text mining problems.
What is different from previous work is that we use information about recursive patterns, instead of s ym bols or direct patterns, as features of input. The inputs are recursively mined and lower-level patterns are coded and then used for higher-level pattern recognition. The higher level patterns seem to better capture the subconscious user's behavior than the symbols of the direct pattern do.
In this paper, we did not discuss feature selection. In our experiments, we manually select some features and use those that can lead to the best results. Sensitivity analysis and cross validation technique [7] will be our next step to improve those selections. FinaHy, the experiments described in this paper all use perfect match when comparing two dominant patterns. We will compare the results with the processing in which matching will allow for small differences in the compared strings.
